History, Literature, Politics

Book Review: Origins of Totalitarianism Part 1

[Content Warning: Discussions of genocide and antisemitism]

Hannah Arendt’s massive study of totalitarianism, The Origins of Totalitarianism, is (at the time of writing), the fourth most popular political theory book on Amazon (after two editions of The Prince, Plato’s Republic, and a Rebecca Solnit book). It’s also a densely written tome, not unsuitable for defending oneself from wild animals. Many of its paragraphs could productively be turned into whole books of their own.

I’m not done it yet. But a review and summary of the whole thing would be far too large for a single blog post. Therefore, I’m going to review its three main sections as I finish them. Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem set my mind afire and spurred my very first essay on political theory, so I’m very excited to be reviewing the section on antisemitism today.

(Reminder: unless I’m specifically claiming a viewpoint as my own, I am merely summarizing Arendt’s views as I best understand them)

Arendt’s history of antisemitism begins when religious pogroms against Jews ended. Arendt isn’t really interested in this earlier persecution, which she views as entirely distinct from later antisemitism. As far as I can tell, there are two reasons that underlie this distinction. The first is the lack of a political component to the earlier pogroms. Their lack of politicization – there was no one in Christendom who really spoke against them – made them almost by definition politically useless.

For antisemitism to become a rallying cry for a movement, it needed to be more than just antisemitism. It had to also implicate a whole host of people despised by the mob, people who could be expected to stand up against antisemitism, or people who could be compared to Jews so as to focus hatred on them (a practice which continues to this day). The unanimity of the Christian pogroms robbed them of any usage in power struggles between Christians, because any Christian could take up the banner of the pogroms and so divide support for their rivals.

Second, there was always one escape from the Christian pogroms: conversion to Christianity. This escape was notably lacking from later, political antisemitism. Jewishness became a racial stain carried down through the generations, not merely a different religion.

Nowhere is this distinction better seen than between the Vichy government and the occupying Germans. The Germans would ask the Vichy regime to exterminate Jews. And the Vichy government would wipe out foreign Jews, or Jews that didn’t have French citizenship, or Jews that weren’t willing to convert. The French were still somewhat in the old Christian mindset of “good” Jews and “bad” Jews. The Germans wished to exterminate all Jews and made no distinctions between good and bad.

Arendt analyzes this second distinction through the lens of vice and crime. To Arendt, a vice is a crime which has become accepted as inextricably linked to certain people, such that they cannot help but commit it. She describes this as similar to an addict being hooked on drugs.

When you accept that certain people have vices, you may excuse them some of their crimes. According to Arendt, in late 19th century/early 20th century society, a judge would face no opposition to giving a lighter sentence for murder to a gay man, or a lighter sentence for treason to a Jew, because these crimes were viewed to be a matter of racial predestination.

(This definition of vice cuts towards one of my most common annoyances with Arendt: she’s very prone to redefining common words to mean other things. This can leave incautious readers to jump to rather the wrong conclusion, as happened most famously with her definition of “think” in Eichmann in Jerusalem.)

The danger that Arendt identifies here is that this “tolerance” for murder or treason can be quickly reversed. And when this happens, it isn’t enough just to punish the traitors or murderers. Everyone who is racially or dispositionally inclined to these crimes must then be “liquidated”.

Hannah Arendt’s exact phrasing of the threat here is:

It is an attraction to murder and treason which hides behind such perverted tolerance, for in a moment it can switch to a decision to liquidate not only all actual criminals but all who are “racially” predestined to commit certain crimes. Such changes take place whenever the legal and political machine is not separated from society so that social standards can penetrate into it and become political and legal rules. The seeming broad-mindedness that equates crime and vice, if allowed to establish its own code of law, will invariably prove more cruel and inhuman than laws, no matter how severe, which respect and recognize man’s independent responsibility for his behavior.

Having separated modern antisemitism from earlier religious pogroms, Arendt also spends some time separating nationalism from totalitarianism. Nationalism, to Arendt, is always inward focused. It views one’s own nation as best and spurns contact with outsiders. Nationalism may be paranoid and bellicose, but it has no desire to expand, nor any desire to coordinate with foreign nationalists. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, is always focused outwards, its eyes set on world domination.

There were, of course, international organizations of both fascists and communists, the two totalitarian ideologies. But I wonder how nations like North Korea (with no real plausible path to world domination) and Eritrea (which as far as I know is entirely inward focused) fit into this framework. Both are definitely totalitarian, but they seem to falsify this important criterion. I’ll look for more on how to parse those countries when I get to the third and final part of this book, which covers totalitarianism itself.

Let’s pause for a second and ask why a book on totalitarianism is focused so much on antisemitism. One of the most enduring questions of 20th century history is “why were the Jews Hitler’s victims?” Why was this people singled out for destruction and not some other? Was it arbitrary? While Hannah Arendt may have some hindsight bias here, to her the attempt at extermination of the Jews was inevitable in light of the international focus of totalitarian ideologies and the international relationships of European Jews.

While banking may have become less and less Jewish dominated over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, European Jews (at least the best off) still had an international bent. Arendt relates an anecdote about the end of the Franco-Prussian war in 1871; apparently Bismarck’s approach to terms was basically ‘have their Jews work it out with our Jews’ and she says that this generalizes to the how other treaties were made at the time.

This international network of leading Jews [1] meant that an antisemitic ideology had to frame itself in international terms to attack Jews, or that an ideology could explain its international bent by attacking Jews. Therefore, by virtue of being a people without a nation (who instead lived in all European nations), European Jews became an excellent justification for an international and expansionist totalitarian power.

I think these rumours of international control were a cruel double bind for the Jewish people: any successful quashing of the rumours of Jewish domination would have just served as proof for the next round, while the failure to quash them, brought about by a very real lack of power, meant that they flourished, despite the fact that their continued existence should have itself been all that was required to prove them false.

The view of Jews as international and of one mind was fueled by the clannishness that came about as a natural result of the social discrimination Jews faced in European society. Anti-Semites could imagine that Jewish endogamy meant that all Jews were of one family and therefore had a single goal, which was normally considered to be “world domination”. If even one member of this global clan was left alive, then the anti-Semites believed that they would have failed.

Antisemitism was a useful tool for whipping up the mob because in early modern times, Jews were despised. Arendt again separates this from the earlier religious hatred and attributes it to Jews losing their old formal position (as the state bankers) but not their “privileges” [2] or (at least as far as visible Jews, like the Rothschilds were concerned) their wealth. This loss of formal position, but not the wealth it brought, is identified by Arendt as a particularly vulnerable and despised state – it is, she claims, the state the French aristocracy found themselves in before the revolution. Arendt even claims that no one hated the aristocracy so much when they were fulfilling the societal function of oppressing peasants, although I wonder if it might instead be possible that they were then just as (or more hated), but possessed a surer monopoly on violence and discourse, such that the earlier hate was better hidden.

Arendt believes that all of these fault lines were compounded by several strategies that were undertaken by Jews, strategies that had served them well in the old days of forced conversions, but that were extremely maladaptive when faced with modern antisemitism.

First, Arendt reckoned that Jews had a special relationship with the state. They had formerly served the state (not the body politic, mind you, but the state) as its bankers, finding the capital it needed to wage its wars and build its monuments. In exchange for this service, the bankers had won special privileges for themselves (although note that these privileges were lesser than those afforded to Christians who served the state as e.g. knights) and some modicum of protection by the state for their coreligionists.

(Because of this requirement for paternalistic protection, any loss of central power for a state was almost always a disaster for Jews; petty warlords certainly did need their moneylending services, but they were much less adept at providing protection in return.)

Arendt reckons that this may have made the Jews of Europe doubly despised, first via the general Christian antipathy that was dominant at the time and second because it meant that any who had reason to hate the state would also hate the Jews, because of their highly visible relationship with it.

That the state had mostly upheld its end of the bargain in this deal led to the second strategy that backfired: the Jews were complacent with mere legal rights, despite their despised status. They thought that legal rights could save them from any of the consequences of being despised [3]. In the modern era, the strength of this purely legal protection was first put to test in France, when the Dreyfus Affair erupted.

Captain Alfred Dreyfus was a French Jew who was wrongly convicted of treason in 1894. In 1896, new evidence came to light that showed he was innocent. The military suppressed this evidence and trumped up new charges against Dreyfus, but word leaked out and a scandal was quickly born.

It is said that while the affair was ongoing, nearly everyone in Europe had an opinion on it. Nominally, the Dreyfusards believed Dreyfus was innocent, while the anti-Dreyfusards believed he was guilty, but both positions quickly gained several ancillary beliefs. Dreyfusards became noted for their anti-clerical positions – including that “secret Rome” controlled much of global affairs [4]. The anti-Dreyfusards became authoritarian, nationalistic, and fiercely anti-Semitic. They believed that “secret Judah” controlled everything.

I want to stress how little importance people ended up putting on Dreyfus. La Croix, a Catholic newspaper at one point stated: “it is no longer a question whether Dreyfus is innocent or guilty but only of who will win, the friends of the army or its foes” [5]. It is impossible to explain how the discredited trial of a single military officer could lead to jack-booted thugs attacking intellectuals and crying for “death to the Jews!” without the understanding of the usefulness of antisemitism for whipping up the mob that this book engenders.

“The mob”, as distinct from “the people” is one of the key concepts in Origins of Totalitarianism. It’s Arendt’s most important example of the type of politics she despises and she returns to it again and again. She describes the mob as the “déclassé” and the “residue of all classes”; the mob are those people who are excluded from civil and economic opportunities by virtue of their education (or lack thereof), disposition, personality, or airs, and deeply resent this exclusion, to the point where they wish to destroy the society that excluded them.

Arendt claims that the representation of all classes within the mob makes it easy to mistake the mob as representative of the people in general. Since this argument can be used to disenfranchise basically any group seeking rights, Arendt suggests that the key difference between a mob and a genuine movement lies in what sort of demands the group makes. The people will demand to have their voices heard in government. The mob will demand a strong leader to fix everything (by ripping apart the society that has excluded them). In the case of the anti-Dreyfusards, these strong leaders enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the mob; they were all recovering esthetics and nihilists and saw in the mob a “primitive and virile strength”, something they found admirable and exhilarating.

Remember that there already was a perception that the Jews secretly controlled everything and that this theory was politically useful because it justified an international ideology and allowed for a polarization of society around attacking a hated other. With respect to the mob, Arendt gives a third reason why this sort of conspiracy theory might be useful as a rallying cry: it helps explain why the déclassé of the mob have been cast out of and abandoned by society. It is much easier for them to believe that there is some worldwide conspiracy then that there is some fault of their own.

(I trust that anyone reading this in 2018 sees why I found Arendt’s description of the mob so frightening. In the margin of the passage where she introduces the mob, I have written “MAGA voters?”)

Against the mob (and its steadily escalating violence) stood Clemenceau (then a journalist), Émile Zola, and a small cadre of liberal and radical intellectuals and their supporters. Arendt says that what made their position unique is their support for purely abstract concepts, like justice. If the rallying call of the mob was “Death to the Jews”, then it seems as if the rallying call of those arrayed against it was fiat justitia ruat caelum, or perhaps the old battle-cry of the French First Republic: liberté, égalité, fraternité.

Ultimately, the appeals of the intellectuals convinced the socialists, if not in the primacy of justice, then that their class interests were served by marching against the anti-Dreyfusards. And so the workers took to the streets and the campaign of terror of the mob was ended.

There was of course rather a large difference between ending open violent antisemitism and actually acquitting Dreyfus. Here the good and great of French society, the delegates of the representative assembly, were barely split: all but one opposed a retrial. The fight around a retrial was to simmer (largely outside of the chambers of government) for three years, between 1897 and 1900. During this time, Dreyfusards used the courts and the press to try and sway public opinion and force the manner, while the anti-Dreyfusards, the Catholic priests, and the army tried to launch a coup d’état (though Arendt mocks that whole endeavour to the point where I think they never got very close to actually seizing power).

Notable were the reactions of Jews outside of Dreyfus’s immediate family to the case. Arendt contends that they made such a deal of legal equality, that they believed that if Dreyfus had been found guilty in a court of law, he must be guilty or that if the verdict was false, it was just a legal error, not an attack against them as a people. Arendt is obviously speaking with the benefit of hindsight here; I wonder how obvious any of this could have been to a people used to discrimination, both social and official.

There was a passage here that felt particularly relevant even now. Arendt suggests that society at the time saw every Jew, however penniless as a potential Rothschild (and therefore unworthy of any protection or “special treatment”). Clemenceau, she says, was one of the few true friends the Jews had because he saw them, all of them, even the Rothschilds with their vast fortune, as members of one of Europe’s oppressed people. To this day, despite the Holocaust, the Jew quotas, the cries of “none is too many” by now-dead bureaucrats or “the Jews will not replace us” by a tiki-torch wielding mob today, and the high rate of antisemitic hate crime, it is hard to find many people who will stand up and say that Jews face systematic prejudice and oppression.

The end of the affair reversed Marx’s famous maxim of history, in that it was the farce that presaged tragedy. Appeals to justice failed. The popular hatred of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie failed. Zola and Clemenceau’s appeals all failed. But a threatened boycott of the Paris Exposition of 1900 succeeded. The anti-Dreyfusard government was censured, and Dreyfus was pardoned [6].

It was only much later, via an illegal retrial, that an exoneration was achieved.

The fallout of the trials was far reaching. Rights for Catholics, including Catholic schools, were curtailed. Arendt bitterly remarks that this was a failure of politics; instead of the simple republican principle of equality for all, there was “one exception for Jews, and another which threatened the freedom of conscience for Catholics”.

The trial of Dreyfus occupies more space than any other single incident in the volume on antisemitism. It allows Arendt to introduce the idea of “the mob” and the conspiracy (here Jewish domination) that motivates it. But its centrality is mostly, I think, because Arendt views it as the only harbinger of what was to come; the first incident of true violent antisemitism (remember, Arendt views this as in a separate class from the ubiquitous Christian Jew hatred which characterized pre-modern Europe), as opposed to the “mere” social discrimination Jews faced in European society.

I was shocked by how modern this social discrimination was. Jews were consistently exoticized (some of which must have come from fascination with their “vice”, as Arendt defined it). She recounts a review of a Jewish poet from the 19th century, that laments at the normality of the poetry (the reviewer expected something other from normal human poetry).

This exoticism was both a social curse and a key. It was a curse in that it always set Jews apart and that the spectre of social discrimination, of being so exotic that one became the other, was always present. It was a key in that for certain “exceptional” Jews, Jews that society agreed “weren’t like the others”, the fact of their exception could lead to social climbing. These “exceptional” Jews were alternatively welcomed by, showed off almost like exhibits, or excluded by high society, depending on their rarity, their own merits, and the strength of antisemitic sentiments.

As Jews became more normalized in European society, it became harder and harder to be the exception, while the shadow of social discrimination never lifted. Therefore, increasing normalization led to less acceptance in society, not more. Arendt disagrees with the (she claims) commonly held notion that it was primarily Christian antipathy that kept Jewish communities from dispersion and assimilation in the Middle Ages, but thinks that social discrimination became an important limit on dispersion just as assimilation became possible.

This made me wonder about the nature of assimilation and safety. It’s certainly true that the Irish in America are now obviously safe beyond the reach of any Know-Nothing. But it’s clear that they had to give up something to attain that safety. For assimilated Irish (or assimilated Scots or Germans, the stock of my family), there is little of the old culture and none of the old language left.

The central political question of a multi-ethnic democracy might be “how can we ensure safety, without the need for total assimilation?” And certainly, I do not wish to suggest that assimilation is the surest of safeties. It did not save the assimilated German Jews. I wonder if there is in fact a critically dangerous period during very act of assimilation, where a people is vulnerable and dispersed just as social backlash against their increasing rights reaches a fever pitch.

Here, Arendt has no answers for me.

There might be those who question whether reading about antisemitism from Hannah Arendt is like letting the fox guard the chicken coup; One of the most enduring controversies of Hannah Arendt’s life was her alleged antisemitism. Her romance with the noted philosopher and Nazi Heidegger (although note that their relationship preceded his conversion to Nazism and she did not have contact with him while he was a Nazi), her criticism of Jewish leaders in her coverage of the Eichmann trial, and her criticism of historical Jewish attempts to find safety in this section of The Origins of Totalitarianism are the evidence most often given in support of her supposed “self-hating” nature (as she was herself a Jew, and moreover a German Jew who fled the Nazis).

I think it is certainly true that she was an often-harsh critic of some things that Jews had done and that she wrote perhaps unfairly and with the benefit of hindsight. I think it is also undeniable that she was biased against certain Jews (her cringe-worthy and horribly racist description of Ostjuden and middle-eastern Jews opens Eichmann in Jerusalem).

But I think the evidence for her “antisemitism” is often overstated and mainly comes from misreading her works; I mentioned above just how careful a reader must be if they don’t want to be tripped up by her redefinitions of common words. The criticism that she “defended” Eichmann as “just following orders” and not really culpable can be dispelled simply by reading Eichmann in Jerusalem, a book which ends with her calling for his death and features a section where she systematically dismantles the argument he was just following orders [7].

On the other side of the equation, we have her pioneering work on antisemitism which is fiercely critical of anti-Semites and all who enabled them, her work to resettle Jews in Israel, her work in Eichmann in Jerusalem systematically documenting the extent of the Holocaust, and her fierce and rousing defense of the holocaust as a crime against humanity perpetrated on the body of the Jewish people (from her biopic: “because Jews are human, the very status the Nazis tried to deny them”).

Arendt had standards that were impossibly high and I think she held Jews to higher standards than any other group. She may have been secular, but I think she also still believed that the Jews were God’s chosen people, chosen to be a light among the nations. When others said “we must not judge that, we were not there” about the Jewish leaders and their actions during the Holocaust, Arendt built a system of political theory around the act of judgement, a theory she thought that would be inimical to tyrants and Nazis.

She was assuredly arrogant. She assuredly burned bridges. A set of lecture notes she once prepared said:

For conscience to work: either a very strong religious belief—extremely rare. Or: pride, even arrogance. If you say to yourself in such matters: who am I to judge?—you are already lost.”

There is very little positive said in Part 1 of The Origins of Totalitarianism, which is to say that it doesn’t give us very much idea of what we can do to prevent totalitarianism and barbarism. But if we could ask Hannah Arendt, the great political theorist of the 20th century, the lost child of the French Revolution, she might say something like: “find your principles and stick to them; think about what is the right thing and do it; defend liberty always.”

Or, if I can for a second steal the speech her biopic puts in her mouth:

Since Socrates and Plato, we usually call thinking to be engaged in that silent dialogue between me and myself. In refusing to be a person Eichmann utterly surrendered that single most defining human quality: that of being able to think. And consequently, he was no longer capable of making moral judgements. This inability to think created the possibility for many ordinary men to commit evil deeds on a gigantic scale, the likes of which have never been seen before.

It is true, I have considered these questions in a philosophical way. The manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge, but the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly. And I hope that thinking gives people the strength to prevent catastrophes in these rare moments when the chips are down.

Increasingly, it seems like this might be one of those moments where the chips could be down. I shivered when I read some of Arendt’s descriptions of the mob, because I knew it wasn’t a hypothetical. I’ve seen it, on social media and at rallies. With tiki-torches and with weapons, I have seen the mob. And I hope reading this book and others like it and thinking will give me the strength to act to prevent catastrophe if I am ever so unlucky to have to.

Footnotes:

[1] I want to make it clear that Hannah Arendt (and I) don’t believe the old canard about Jews controlling the world. She specifically mentions this lie being baffling, because when it was started, it was true that a rather small group of European statesmen essentially did control the world. But none of those statesmen were Jewish and all of them were so at cross-purposes that no coordination occurred.

When Arendt talks about internationalism in the European Jewish community, she is simply saying that there were many ties of family and friendship among Jews of different countries, which meant that privileged Jews were more likely to have close associates in countries other than the one in which they resided, even compared to similarly privileged gentiles. ^

[2] “Privileges” here being “were treated the same as gentiles and weren’t discriminated against legally”. I am reminded forcefully of David Schraub’s excellent essay about the recent tendency to equate the Holocaust and occupation of the west bank. I think Arendt unearths reasonable evidence for the claim David makes, that “gentiles believed that superiority over Jews was part of the deal that they were always offered”, such that loss of that superiority feels like a special privilege for Jews. ^

[3] Given that Christian and secular hatred of Jews was without reason, it’s unclear what they could have done to be less despised. ^

[4] There have been several times in history when its looked like conspiracies against Catholics would reach the same fever pitch as those against Jews, but this has never quite materialized. Catholics in North America are still more likely to face hate crimes than other Christian denominations, but the number and severity of these crimes pale in comparison to the crimes conducted against Jews.

Even if the internationalism of the Catholic Church and its occasional use of the confessional for political gain (although the latter has not been seen in recent times), make it an appealing target for conspiracy theories, it offers much less in terms of racial theories. In Germany at least, racial theories would have been much less effective if the target was Catholicism, since essentially all Germans had been Catholic before the reformation and associated wars of religion. That said, Christianity arose from Judaism, so I’m not sure if the targeting of Jews rather than Catholics can be explained by religious lineage alone. ^

[5] How’s this for a case study on politicization, or a toxoplasma of rage? ^

[6] Zola hated the pardon. He said all it accomplished was “to lump together in a single stinking pardon men of honour with the hoodlums”. ^

[7] This was very important to Arendt, because she needed to show the totality of moral collapse in “respectable” German society in order to prove her point about the banality of evil. She recounts that Eichmann actually ignored Himmler’s orders to stop killing Jews, because within the context of the third Reich, they were unlawful orders that went against the values of the state. She then goes on to present distressing evidence about just how far this moral rot extended and just how easy it was for Hitler to cultivate it. ^

Advice

An Apology is a Surrender

[Content Warning: Discussion of the men who have recently been implicated in sexual harassment and assault]

Why do so many people undermine their apologies with defensiveness?

When celebrity chef Mario Batali apologized for sexually harassing his employees, he included a link to a recipe at the end of the email.

This fits into the pattern we’ve seen in many of the recently named abusers. When (if) they apologize, they’re sure to lace it with a few face saving measures:

  • “[I apologize if I’ve hurt anyone], but I remember the incident differently” (Al Franken)
  • “[It’s] not reflective of who I am.” (Dustin Hoffman)
  • “I appreciate the way I’ve behaved with colleagues in the past has caused a lot of pain, and I sincerely apologize for it”, followed by “Any allegations of non-consensual sex are unequivocally denied by Mr. Weinstein. Mr. Weinstein has further confirmed that there were never any acts of retaliation against any women for refusing his advances” via a spokesperson. (Harvey Weinstein)

Amazingly, and for the first time I can remember, (most) people aren’t buying it.

Ignoring most of these apologies is almost certainly the correct response. In fact, I wouldn’t even call them apologies. An apology is a surrender. These statements are rearguards.

What I mean is: as long as you’re defending yourself, you aren’t internalizing the consequences of your actions. For as long as you keep fighting, you get to keep believing that maybe consequences won’t materialize. Maybe you’ll say the right thing; maybe the consequences will disappear.

An apology accepts consequences.

Imagine yourself arguing with someone you’ve hurt. Imagine the wiggle words and excuses you might use. Imagine the fear you feel, the fear of failure, or the fear of hurting someone you love. Imagine how easy it is to give into that fear. Imagine how hard it is to ignore it, to be quiet, to listen when someone tells you that you’ve hurt them.

Doing that, despite the voice inside you telling you to fight, telling you to try and get away clean, that’s scary; that’s difficult. That’s a surrender.

(This is probably a good place to mention the law of equal and opposite advice; some people reading this probably need to surrender more and some people probably need to surrender less. This advice is aimed at the people who need to surrender more. Hopefully you know who you are? If you need to surrender less and you’ve wasted time reading this, sorry. Have some photos of a delightful owl/dog friendship as recompense.)


Of course, surrendering is just the first step. It’s best if you back it up with something of substance. My four-step algorithm for a proper surrender-apology goes:

1. How did I hurt them?

Sometimes people will tell you straight up how you hurt them. Others won’t. And when you’re proactively apologizing, you may know that you did something likely to hurt someone, but not exactly how you hurt them.

To figure out how you hurt someone, consult your mental model of them. Try and remember what makes them sad or insecure. How did your action intersect with that? Don’t assume they’ll be hurt in the same way as you would. Let’s say you played a prank on a co-worker involving paint that ruined their outfit and made them really mad. You might be mad if someone played a similar prank on you because of the ruined clothes. But maybe they’re mad because they’re quiet and anxious and you put them on the spot in an embarrassing situation in front of a lot of people. If that was the case, the clothes might barely even register for them. Therefore, it’s best if you don’t focus your apology on the clothes, but on the embarrassment.

If you don’t know how you hurt someone, or you want to check if you guessed correctly, you can ask:

  • Did <my action X> make you feel <Y>?
  • It seems like <my action X> made you really sad. Can you help me understand how I hurt you?
  • I suspect you might be feeling <Y>, is that correct?
  • If someone did <my action X> to me, I’d be feeling <Y>. Is that what you feel right now?

When asking these questions, be careful to keep your tone neutral and not accusatory and to back off if whoever you’re apologizing to doesn’t seem keen on answering. Also note that there’s always some risk in asking questions; some people believe that you should just know how you hurt them. I don’t endorse this as a social norm, but I understand where the feeling comes from and want to make note of it.

2. Validate and Apologize

Here’s a good script for the start of an apology:

“I am really sorry that I did X. It seems like the kind of thing that would make you feel Y, which makes a lot sense. It’s crappy that I did that to you. You are an important person in my life and I want to work to avoid doing this again.”

Being able to articulate how you hurt someone shows empathy. It also shows that you aren’t horribly self-centred. The focus is on their pain, not your need to have an apology accepted.

Above all other things, avoid the passive voice here. There’s no point being sorry that someone “was hurt”. Nothing says “I am apologizing only because it socially expected” like the passive voice.

Notice also that this script validates what the person is feeling. It proactively assures them that there isn’t something wrong with them for feeling hurt. It makes it clear that their response is reasonable, expected, and that you’re the one who did something wrong.

This is one opportunity to surrender. It is excruciatingly difficult to accept full responsibility for your actions without giving any excuses. But it’s important that you do that first. It shows how serious you are and really helps to validate the emotions of the person you’re apologizing to.

3. (If desired) Explain yourself

After you’ve made a mistake, people often want to be assured that you are a fundamentally reasonable person who doesn’t go around hurting friends for fun. If someone asks you “why?”, you should be prepared to explain yourself.

I think it is best to be brutally honest here, which means you first have to be prepared to be brutally honest with yourself. “I just don’t know what came over me” is a comforting excuse; it implies that this was sudden, incomprehensible, and unlikely to happen again – so don’t allow yourself to believe it! Cop-outs like that allow you to avoid your failings. In almost all cases, “I just don’t know what came over me” (or its ilk) can be replaced with something like:

  • “Our relationship made me feel undesirable and they made me feel sexy again”
  • “I thought it would be fun and that I could convince you to feel okay about it later”
  • “I was so fixated on how funny it would be that I didn’t want to think about whether it was right or wrong”
  • “I’m so used to doing things for other people. I thought ‘fuck it, I’m going to do this just for me'”

Here you must surrender any belief you have that what you did “just happened”. There’s almost certainly a reason for it and the reason is probably uncomfortable – and probably points to some other problem with you or your relationship.

I have a bad habit of leaving this step out, even when asked. Part of this is that I’m personally against excusing myself and part of this is that being “against excuses” is a great cop-out when you aren’t very proud of your actual reasons. But I’m trying to get better, because I think people do find it discomfiting to have their request for explanation ignored.

Apologies aren’t magic. Sometimes even the most sincere and heartfelt apology won’t change someone’s mind if they’ve decided they don’t want to be around you anymore. If that’s the case, take your leave as gracefully as you can and try and figure out how you can do better in similar situations in the future. A sincere apology definitionally cannot be contingent on getting something in return.

4. (If desired) Discuss how to avoid this in the future

This is another step that it’s tempting to jump to, perhaps before you’ve even finished apologizing. It’s nice to believe that if you convince someone that you’ll avoid something in the future, you don’t really have to apologize for it now. This is part of the fast-talking school of apology, where you overwhelm someone with excuses, plans for the future, and rushed sorries so that you don’t ever have to surrender, admit you’re in the wrong, or fundamentally change anything about yourself.

Instead of rushing into this, you should wait until the person you’re apologizing to has had time to digest your apology and thought about what they want. Maybe they don’t want to talk about it at all. Maybe they have specific things they want from you and don’t want to feel like they’re fighting against your plans for the future.

What I’m saying is that while this can be useful, it can also hurt. Make sure whoever you’re apologizing to is ready to hear this part of the apology and wants to hear this part of the apology.

How you plan to avoid your mistakes in the future will probably be unique to your circumstances. That said, one piece of advice I have is to avoid the outcome bias. If you would do the same things again in the same situation because you expect it on average to be positive, you aren’t doing anyone a favour by lying about it. Address the ways in which your decision making was suspect. Don’t weasel out of anything by promising not to do specific actions when you know full well you’d do the same general thing again.

And if you’ve hurt someone in the same way a bunch of times, you may find that plans no longer cut it. Them forgiving you can become contingent on results, not words.

Ultimately, an apology is an acknowledgement that you would have acted differently in the situation if you were better at acting the way you want to act. An apology indicates a willingness to change. If you instead endorse the actions you took and have no intent of deciding differently in the future, you shouldn’t apologize at all. If this is the case, you can tell whoever you hurt that you regret hurting them. You can tell them that you wish they hadn’t been hurt. But you cannot truthfully tell them you wouldn’t hurt them that same way again if you have any choice in the matter. So, don’t walk down the road that ends that way.

It isn’t worth it.


In the examples at the start, it seemed the only thing anyone regretted was getting caught. Remember that these are the examples that our culture provides; it’s no wonder that it’s easy to learn the wrong lessons about apologies! When apologizing to our loved ones, it’s natural to let these lessons seep in and make us defensive when we should be open. Apologizing better requires a conscious act, one that I’m still learning how to do. This post is my attempt to chronicle these tentative efforts in a way that might be useful to others who are also struggling.

Economics, Falsifiable, Politics

Franchise Economics: Why Tim Hortons Has Become A Flashpoint In The Minimum Wage Fight

Since the minimum wage increase took effect on January 1st, Tim Hortons has been in the news. Many local franchisees have been clawing back benefits, removing paid breaks, or otherwise taking measures to reduce the costs associated with an increased minimum wage.

TVO just put out a piece about this ongoing saga by the Christian socialist Michael Coren. It loudly declares that “Tim Hortons doesn’t deserve your sympathy“. Unfortunately, Mr. Coren is incorrect. Everyone involved here (Tim Hortons the corporation, Tim Hortons franchisees, and Tim Hortons workers) is caught between a rock and a hard place. They all deserve your sympathy.

This Tim Hortons could be literally anywhere in suburban or rural Canada. Image Credit: Marek Ślusarczyk via Wikipedia Commons

It is a truism that a minimum wage increase must result in either declining profits, cuts to other costs, or rising prices. While supporters of the minimum wage increase would love to see it all come out of profits, that isn’t reasonable.

Basic economics tell us that as we approach a perfect market, profits should fall to zero. The key assumptions underpinning this are global perfect information (so no one can have any innovations that allow them to do better than anyone else) and zero start-up costs (so anyone can enter any market at any time). Obviously, these assumptions aren’t true in reality, but when it comes to fast food, they’re fairly close to true.

It is relatively cheap to start a fast-food restaurant (compared to say opening a factory). The start-up costs for a McDonalds, KFC, or Wendy’s are $1,000,000 to $2.3 million, while a Subway costs about $100,000 to $250,000 to start. This means that whenever someone sees fast-food restaurants making large profits in an area, they can open their own and take a fraction of the business, driving everyone’s profits down.

They’re probably driven down much lower than you think. If you had to guess, what would you say the profit margins for a fast-food restaurant are? If you’re anything like people in this study, you probably think something like 35%. The actual answer is 6% [1].

In addition to telling me that the average fast food restaurant has a 6% profit margin, that link helpfully told me that 29% of operating expenses in a fast-food restaurant come from labour costs. Raising those labour costs by 20% by increasing wages 20% increases total costs by 6% [2]. The minimum wage isn’t making fast-food restaurant owners make do with a little less in the way of profits. It’s entirely wiping out profits.

Now maybe your response to that is “well my heart doesn’t really bleed for that big multinational losing its profits”. But that’s not how Tim Hortons works. Tim Hortons, like almost all fast-food restaurants is a franchise. Tim Hortons the corporation makes money by collecting fees and providing services to Tim Hortons the restaurants, which are owned by the mythical small business owners™ that everyone (even the proponents of the minimum wage increase) claim to care so much about.

Most of these owners aren’t scions of wealthy families, but are instead ordinary members of their communities who saw opening a Tim Hortons as an investment, a vocation, or as a way to give back. They need to eat as much as their workers.

Faced with rising labour costs and no real profit buffer to absorb them, these owners can only cut costs or raise prices.

Except they can’t raise prices.

That’s the rub of a franchise system. The corporate office wants everything to be the exact same at every store. They set prices and every store must follow them. But there’s divergent incentives here. Tim Hortons the corporation makes a profit by selling supplies to its franchises; critically, they make a profit on supplies whether those franchisees turn a profit or not. They really don’t want to raise prices, because raising prices will hurt their bottom line.

It’s well known that (in general) the more expensive something is, the less people want it. Raising prices will hurt the sales volume of Tim Hortons franchises, which will decrease the profits at corporate Tim Hortons. The minimum wage hike affects Tim Hortons the corporation very little. They might see slightly increased shipping costs, but their costs are far less dependent on Canadian minimum wage labour. Honestly, the minimum wage increase probably is a net good for Tim Hortons the corporation. More money in people’s pockets means more money spent on fast-food.

Tim Hortons the corporation probably won’t say it, because they don’t want to antagonize their franchisees, but this minimum wage hike is great for them.

So, Tim Hortons franchisees have to cut costs or run charities. Given that they are running restaurants and not charities, we can probably assume that they’re going to cut costs. Why does it have to be labour costs that get cut? Can’t they just get their supplies for cheaper?

Here the franchise system bites them again. If they were independent restaurateurs, they might be able to source cheaper ingredients, reduce the ply of the toilet paper in their bathrooms, etc. and get their profits back this way.

But they’re franchisees. Tim Hortons the corporation has a big list of everything you need to run a Tim Hortons and you are only allowed to buy it from them. They get to set the prices however they want. And what they want is to keep them steady.

The only cost that Tim Hortons the corporation doesn’t control is labour costs. So, this is what franchisees have to cut.

There are two ways to decrease your labour costs. You can “increase productivity”, or you can cut wages and benefits. “Increase productivity” is the clinical and uninformative way of saying “fire 20% of your workers and verbally abuse the others until they work faster” or “fire 20% of your workers and replace them with machines”. While increased productivity is generally desirable from an economics point of view, it is often more ambiguous from a moral point of view.

Given that the minimum wage was just raised and it is illegal to pay any less than it, Tim Hortons franchisees cannot cut wages. So, if they’re against firing their employees and want to keep making literally any money, they have to cut benefits.

This might make it seem like corporate Tim Hortons is the bad guy here. They aren’t. The executives at Tim Hortons labour under what is called a fiduciary duty. They have a legal obligation to protect shareholder interests from harm and to act for the good of the corporation, not their own private good or for their private moral beliefs. They are responding to the minimum wage hike the way the government has told them to respond [3].

Minimum wage jobs suck. For all that economists claim there is no moral judgement implied in a wage, that it merely shows the intersection of the amount of supply of a certain type of labour and the demand for that labour, it can be hard to believe that there is no moral dimension to this when people making one wage struggle to make ends meet, while those earning another can buy fancy cars they don’t even need.

It is popular to blame business owners and capitalists for the wages their workers make and to say that it shows how little they value their workers. I don’t think that’s merited here. Corporate Tim Hortons has crunched the numbers and decided that if they raise prices, fewer people will buy coffee, their profits will decrease, and they might be personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty. In the face of rising prices, franchisees try and do whatever they can to stay afloat. We can say that caring about profits more than the wages their workers make shows immense selfishness on the part of these franchisees, but it’s little different than the banal selfishness anyone shows when they care more about making money for themselves than making money and giving it away – or the selfishness we show when we want our coffee to be cheaper than it can be when made by someone earning a wage that can comfortably support a family.

Footnotes

[1] As long as there are other available investments approximately as risky as opening a fast-food restaurant that return at least 6%, profits shouldn’t drop any lower than that. In this way, inefficiencies in other sectors could stop fast food restaurants from behaving like they were in a perfectly free market even if they were. ^

[2] This calculation is flawed, in that there are probably other costs making up total labour costs (like benefits) beyond simple wage income. On the other hand, it isn’t just wages that are going up. Other increased costs probably balance out any inaccuracies, making the conclusions essentially correct. This is to say nothing for corporate taxes, which further reduce profits. ^

[3] We can’t blame fiduciary duty, because fiduciary duty is how investing at all can happen. You might not like investing, but without investing, saving for retirement or having a national pension plan is impossible. If your response to this is to say “well let’s just tear down capitalism and start over”, I’d like to remind you that people tried that and it led to a) famine, b) gulags, c) death squads, d) more famine, and e) persistent shortages of every consumer good imaginable, including food ^

Falsifiable

2018 Predictions

Inspired by Slate Star Codex, this is my second year of making predictions (see also: my previous predictions, their scores, and my recent LessWrong post about these predictions).

Before I jump into the predictions, I want to mention that I’ve created templates so that anyone who wants to can also take a stab at it; the templates focus on international events and come in two versions:

  • Long (which assumes you read global news a lot)
  • Short (which is less demanding)

With both these sheets, the idea is to pick a limited number of probabilities (I recommend 51%, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90%) and assign one to each item that you have an opinion on. At the end of the year, you count the number of correct items in each probability bin and use that to see how close you were to ideal. This gives you an answer to the important question: “when I say something is 80% likely to happen, how likely, really, is it to happen?”

You can also make your own (or use the set of questions Slate Star Codex normally uses). If you do make your own, please link your post (and maybe also your template?) in the comments or post it to the front page. It’s my hope that this post can serve as a convenient place for the LW community to look at the predictions of everyone who wants to participate in this experiment!

With that out of the way, here’s my guesses for the next year.

Canada

  1. Liberals remain ahead in the CBC Poll Tracker seat projection – 70%
  2. Trudeau has a higher net favorability rating than Andrew Scheer according to the CBC Leader Meter on January 1, 2019 – 80%
  3. Marijuana is legalized in time for Canada Day – 60%
  4. Marijuana is legalized in 2018 – 90%
  5. At least one court finds the assisted dying bill isn’t in line with Carter v Canada – 70%
  6. Ontario PC party wins the election – 60%
  7. The Ontario election results in a minority government – 80%
  8. The Quebec election results in a minority government – 80%
  9. No BC snap election in 2018 – 90%
  10. No terrorist attack in Canada that kills > 10 Canadians in 2018 – 90%
  11. More Canadian opioid poisoning deaths in 2018 than in 2017 – 60%
  12. Canada does better at the 2018 Winter Olympics (in both gold medals and total medals) than in 2014 – 90%
  13. Canada does not win a gold medal in men’s hockey at the 2018 Olympics – 70%
  14. Canada does win a gold medal in women’s hockey at the 2018 Olympics – 51%

America

  1. Trump announces that the US is pulling out of NAFTA and begins the process of putting the US withdrawal into motion – 51%
  2.  Less than 100km of concrete wall on the border with Mexico will be constructed – 90%
  3. No registry of Muslims created – 90%
  4. Congress doesn’t take action to extend DACA – 80%
  5. No department of the Federal Government is eliminated – 90%
  6. There isn’t a government shutdown before the midterm elections – 60%
  7. Democrats take back the house in the 2018 midterm elections – 80%
  8. Democrats take back the senate in the 2018 midterm elections – 60%
  9. Mueller’s investigation finishes in 2018 – 60%
  10. Impeachment proceedings aimed at Trump are not started in 2018 – 80%
  11. Trump is still president at the end of 2018 – 90%
  12. No terrorist attack in America that kills > 10 Americans – 70%
  13. No terrorist attack in America that kills > 100 Americans – 90%
  14. Susan Collins doesn’t get the Obamacare stabilization measures she was promised – 70%
  15. More US opioid poisoning deaths in 2018 than in 2017 – 80%

South America

  1. FARC peace deal remains in place on January 1, 2019 – 80%
  2. The black market exchange rate for Venezuelan Bolivars is above 110,000 to the US dollar on January 1, 2019 (as measured by DolarToday) – 80%
  3. Inflation in Venezuela is above 100% for the year of 2018 (as measured by DolarToday) – 90%
  4. United Socialist party retains control of the Venezuelan presidency in 2018 – 90%
  5. Protests (and the official response to those protests) result in more than 100 fatalities in Venezuela in 2018 – 60%
  6. Protests (and the official response to those protests) do not result in more than 1000 fatalities in Venezuela in 2018 – 70%
  7. Major Venezuelan opposition groups do not enter any sort of power sharing agreement with the Venezuelan regime in 2018 – 80%

Middle East

  1. No Israeli politician is indicted by the ICC over settlement activity in 2018 – 90%
  2. There isn’t an election in Israel in 2018 – 80%
  3. US does not physically relocate its embassy to Jerusalem in 2018 – 90%
  4. No Palestinian led Intifada in Israel that results in the deaths of >1000 combined attackers, security forces, and civilians (this is a conflict characterized by suicide bombing and police responses) – 70%
  5. No Israeli led operation in the West Bank or Gaza that results in the deaths of >1000 combined soldiers, civilians, and militants (this is a conflict characterized by rocket fire and military strikes) – 70%
  6. Fatah and Hamas do not meaningfully reconcile in 2018 (e.g. Fatah still doesn’t control Gaza by January 1, 2019) – 51%
  7. No significant resurgence in ISIL in 2018 (e.g. it does not gain territory over the next year) – 80%
  8. Fewer casualties in the Syrian Civil War in 2018 than in 2017 – 70%
  9. No power sharing agreement or durable ceasefire (typified by the three months following the agreement each having less than 500 fatalities) in Syria in 2018 – 80%
  10. Bashar Al Assad is still President of Syria on January 1, 2019 – 90%
  11. Protests in Iran do not result in more than 1000 fatalities by the end of 2018 – 70%
  12. Protests in Iran do not result in more than 100 fatalities by the end of 2018 – 51%
  13. Hassan Rouhani is still President of Iran on January 1, 2019 – 90%
  14. No new international sanctions against Iran (does not include adding new organizations or individuals to old categories and requires coordinated participation of at least two countries) – 80%
  15. No new US sanctions against Iran (does not include adding new organizations or individuals to old categories) – 51%
  16. No attack on the Iranian nuclear program by Israel – 90%
  17. Iran does not withdraw from the deal limiting its nuclear program – 90%
  18. Conditional on Iran remaining in the nuclear deal, inspectors find no evidence of violations after the deal began – 90%
  19. Yemen Civil War continues – 60%
  20. Saudi Arabia pulls troops out of Yemen – 51%
  21. Mohammed bin Salman either remains as crown prince of Saudi Arabia, or becomes king (i.e. no coup or succession shake-up) – 80%
  22. Rockets fired from Yemen cause casualties in another country – 51%
  23. No resolution or lifting of embargo in the Qatar crisis – 80%
  24. OPEC production cuts continue through to the end of 2018 – 60%

Africa

  1. No power sharing between ZANU-PF and the opposition will happen in Zimbabwe before the elections (if they occur) in 2018 – 80%
  2. Zimbabwe will hold election in 2018 – 70%
  3. No peace deal ends South Sudan fighting – 70%
  4. Libya still has two rival governments on January 1, 2019 – 70%
  5. No protests, riots, or rebellion in Egypt that kills >100 people in a one week period – 80%
  6. No protests, riots, or rebellion in Tunisian kills >50 people in a one week period – 90%
  7. No terrorist attack in Tunisia kills >20 people – 80%
  8. Zuma is not impeached in 2018 – 51%

Asia

  1.  Inflation rate in Japan still remains below 1% in 2018 – 70%
  2. Japanese constitutional reform (removing pacifism) does not occur in 2018 – 51%
  3. China will not deploy its military against Taiwan or Hong Kong in 2018 – 90%
  4. North Korea will test a submarine launched ballistic missile in 2018 – 70%
  5. North Korea will not test nuclear weapons or launch any missiles during the 2018 Olympics – 80%
  6. North Korea will test a nuclear weapon in 2018 – 51%
  7. No country will attempt to shoot down a North Korean missile test in 2018 – 80%
  8. If there is an attempt, it will succeed – 51%
  9. North Korea tests a missile that is judged by experts at 38 North as likely able to carry a plausible North Korean nuclear weapon to the United States – 60%
  10. No current member of China’s Politburo Standing Committee visits North Korea in 2018 – 70%
  11. No meeting between Kim Jung-un and Moon Jae-in in 2018 – 90%

Europe

  1. No resolution to the crisis in Ukraine – 80%
  2. Russian GDP growth is less than 3% – 80%
  3. No gain of greater than 20% in the value of the ruble vs. the dollar – 70%
  4. Sanctions against Russia are not significantly rolled back (e.g. sanctions remain in place against Rosneft, Novate, Gazprombank and Vnesheconombank by all members of the G7 remain in place at the end of 2018) – 90%
  5. Angela Merkel remains chancellor of Germany – 60%
  6. Germany holds another election before a government can be formed – 51%
  7. No date set for another Scottish referendum in 2018 – 80%
  8. Teresa May remains prime minister of the United Kingdom – 70%
  9. The UK does not terminate the process of Brexit in 2018 – 90%
  10. There is no final Brexit withdrawal deal reached in 2019 (Donald Tusk wishes to have one by October) – 51%
  11. No snap election/vote of no-confidence in the UK in 2018 – 80%
  12. Poland’s EU voting rights aren’t suspended – 90%
  13. Poland and Hungary continue to refuse to accept migrant quotas – 90%
Falsifiable

Grading my 2017 Predictions

Now is the big reveal. Just how did I do in 2017?

Canada

  1. Trudeau ends the year with a lower approval rating than he started – 60%
  2. No bill introduced that changes the electoral system away from first past the post in 2019 – 50%
  3. No referendum scheduled on changing the electoral system away from first past the post before 2019 – 70%
  4. A bill legalizing marijuana is passed by the House of Commons – 90%
  5. The senate doesn’t block attempts to legalize marijuana – 80%
  6. At least one court finds the assisted dying bill isn’t in line with Carter v Canada – 60%
  7. Ontario Liberal Approval rating remains below 30% – 80%
  8. Patrick Brown “unsure” rating remains above 40% – 70%
  9. Kellie Leitch is not the next CPC leader – 80%
  10. Michael Chong is not the next CPC leader – 70%
  11. Maxine Bernier is not the next CPC leader – 90%
  12. No terrorist attack that kills >10 Canadians – 70%
  13. No terrorist attack that kills >100 Canadians – 90%
  14. At least one large technology company (valuation >$10 billion and >1,000 employees) will open a Waterloo office in 2017 – 80%

 

America

  1. Trump will veto at least 1 bill passed by the House and Senate – 70%
  2. Changes to NAFTA will not significantly affect Canada (e.g. introduce tariffs, eliminate visas, etc) – 80%
  3. Less than 100km of concrete wall on the border with Mexico will be constructed – 80%
  4. Unemployment rate changes by less than 0.5% in 2017 – 90%
  5. Bay Area housing prices increase in 2017 – 90%
  6. Protests (in America) on Trump’s inauguration day draw at least 1 million people – 80%
  7. Protests (in America) on Trump’s inauguration day draw at least 5 million people – 50%
  8. Protests (in America) on Trump’s inauguration day draw less than 10 million people – 70%
  9. Protests outside of America on Trump’s inauguration day draw at least 1 million people – 60%
  10. Terrorist attack in America that kills at least 10 Americans – 70%
  11. No terrorist attack in America that kills at least 100 Americans – 70%
  12. No registry of Muslims created in America – 90%
  13. New Supreme Court Justice is named to the USSC – 90%
  14. No repeal of any of: the individual mandate, the prohibition on denying coverage for pre-existing conditions, children remaining on their parents insurance plans until they are 25 – 70%
  15. gov is taken offline or otherwise rendered inoperative by the new administration – 80%
  16. No Federal Department is eliminated – 80%

South America

  1. No setback to the FARC peace deal significant enough to cause >1000 rebels to rearm – 70%
  2. On the black market, the exchange rate for Venezuelan Bolivars to US Dollars remains above 3000 bolivars per dollar. (As measured by DolarToday) – 80%
  3. Inflation in Venezuela for 2017 is higher than 100% (As measured by DolarToday) – 90%
  4. United Socialist party retains control of the Venezuelan presidency – 70%
  5. No uprising in Venezuela leading to >1000 combined civilian and soldier deaths – 70%

Middle East

  1. The “Regulation” Bill, legalizing many illegal settlements, is passed in Israel – 60%
  2. No Israeli politician is indicted by the ICC over settlement activity in 2017 – 80%
  3. The US moves its embassy to Jerusalem – 50%
  4. OPEC agreement fails (as evidenced by Saudi Arabia increasing oil production to >10.058 million BPD) – 50%
  5. Iraq takes back Mosul – 90%
  6. Mosul Dam does not fail – 70%
  7. Fewer casualties in Syrian Civil War in 2017 than in 2016 – 60%
  8. No new international sanctions against Iran – 80%
  9. No new US sanctions against Iran – 50%
  10. No attack on the Iranian nuclear program by Israel – 80%
  11. Iran does not withdraw from the deal limiting its nuclear program – 80%
  12. Conditional on Iran remaining in the nuclear deal, inspectors find no evidence of violations after the deal began – 90%
  13. Yemen Civil War continues – 60%

Africa

  1. Power transition in The Gambia requires ECOWAS troops – 50%
  2. Power transition occurs in The Gambia – 70%
  3. No peace deal ends South Sudan fighting – 50%
  4. IS or affiliated groups do not hold more territory in Africa at the end of 2017 than at the beginning – 90%
  5. Libya has a single government by the end of 2017 – 50%
  6. No protests, riots, or rebellion in Egypt that kills >100 people in a one week period – 80%
  7. No protests, riots, or rebellion in Tunisian kills >50 people in a one week period – 90%
  8. At least one terrorist attack kills >50 people in Tunisian – 50%

Asia

  1. Inflation rate in Japan remains below 1% in 2017 – 70%
  2. No Japanese snap election in 2017 – 90%
  3. Scandal involving Thailand’s new king makes its way to a major Western Newspaper – 50%
  4. Saenuri Party loses in the 2017 South Korean election – 80%
  5. China will send at least one diplomatic “insult” to the US (e.g. expelling an ambassador or consul or closing on of its embassies or consulates) – 60%
  6. By the end of 2017, none of the young lawmakers associated with the Umbrella Revolution will be in the Hong Kong parliament – 60%
  7. The Hong Kong lawmakers who are appealing their ban from parliament will have their final appeals denied – 80%
  8. China will not deploy its military against either Hong Kong or Taiwan in 2017 – 90%
  9. North Korea detonates a nuclear weapon – 70%
  10. North Korea does not demonstrate a completed weapon system (e.g. miniaturized bomb and ICBM capable of threatening the continental United States) – 90%

Europe

  1. No resolution to the crisis in Ukraine – 70%
  2. Crimea remains part of Russia – 90%
  3. Russian GDP growth is less than 2% – 80%
  4. No gain of greater than 15% in the value of the ruble vs the dollar – 60%
  5. Angela Merkel remains Chancellor of Germany – 60%
  6. Marie Le Pen does not become President of France – 70%
  7. Geert Wilders does not become Prime Minister of the Netherlands – 70%
  8. UK invokes Article 50 – 60%
  9. Conditional on the UK invoking article 50, this occurs behind schedule – 70%
  10. Conditional on the UK leaving the EU, Scotland prepares for another referendum – 80%
  11. No snap election called in the UK – 80%
  12. No regional independence movement (e.g. Scotland, Catalan) achieves success in Europe in 2017 – 90%
  13. Sanctions against Russia are not significantly rolled back (e.g. sanctions remain in place against Rosneft, Novate, Gazprombank and Vnesheconombank by all members of the G7 remain in place at the end of 2017) – 60%

Personal

  1. I will not break up with anyone I am currently dating – 90%
  2. I will buy a car – 50%
  3. I will still be working at my current job at the end of 2017 – 80%
  4. I will not move to another city in 2017 – 90%
  5. Conditional on remaining in my current city, I will not move to a different apartment in 2017 – 80%
  6. I will read at least 40 books this year – 80%
  7. I will read at least 10 non-fiction books this year – 50%
  8. I will start reading (and read at least 50 pages) of at least 10 books people recommended to me this year – 60%
  9. I will write at least 200,000 words this year – 80%
  10. I will post at least 15 blog posts or short stories – 80%
  11. I will post at least 25 blog posts or short stories – 50%
  12. I will be >15% over or under-confident for at least 2 confidence levels in these predictions (before taking into account this prediction) – 80%

Notes

I thought that making my predictions mostly numerical would make them easy to grade. This mostly worked, but there were a few edge cases, judgement calls, and other amusing things that I want to explicitly mention:

  • Throughout my predictions I used the word “remains”. I regret this, because it is ambiguous. I think I intended it to mean “on January 1st, 2018, X remains true”, but there’s an alternative parsing that is “during all of 2017, X will be true”. I feel it’s most accurate to grade these according to my intent. For my 2018 predictions, I will use clearly language.
  • For 8, the two most recent polls I could find were both from November. In one, Patrick Brown had a “don’t know” rating of 50%. In the other, it was 34%. Polls were found by Googling ‘ontario leader popularity’ and ‘ontario leader popularity politics’; November was the last month in which I could find polls, so I only used November polls. I’m averaging these two and considering the prediction successful. The lack of good aggregation of Ontario political information is part of why I would like to create a website tracking the Ontario election this year.
  • While I was correct as to the who wasn’t the next leader of the Conservative party, I definitely got emotionally involved such that I was severely miscalibrated. Bernier came far closer to winning it then Leitch or Chong and both of those two fringe candidates had much lower chances that it felt like they did.
  • WRT 24 and 25, I’m not counting the Las Vegas shooting as a terrorist attack because it lacked a political motive (as far as we currently know). I think I overestimated the risk of terrorist attack because of the availability heuristic (the last two years had seen a higher than normal amount of successful and dangerous terrorist attacks). A proper estimation would have focused more on the base rate.
  • I don’t think Trump’s cancellation of advertising comes anywhere close to fulfilling 29, so I’m marking it as failed.
  • 31 is borderline, with many former FARC fighters “joining criminal gangs or a dissident FARC movement that has about 1,000 fighters nationwide“. Given that this still implies less than 1000 members rearmed to continue the fight as FARC, I think the prediction holds.
  • 38 is also borderline, but ultimately, I think there is a difference between an announcement of intent to move and an actual movement. Since I was going to mark 28 as a success if Trump hadn’t signed the tax bill by now, it’s only fair that I mark 38 as a failure.
  • I was way under-confident in the stability of the Mosul dam (41). Compare my probability with the chance on the Good Judgement Project and you’ll see I really overstated the risk compared to the consensus.
  • WRT to 43 and 44, the US Treasury added new groups to existing designations, but these are neither new sanctions, nor international sanctions
  • For 59, I think this Daily Mail headline counts: “Thailand’s colourful new King brought ‘his mistress AND his former air stewardess wife’ to his father’s lavish cremation ceremony with both marching in bearskin hats“. I think I want to stay away from prediction “scandals” in the future though, because it’s a very fuzzy concept.
  • While North Korea claims to have a complete, miniaturized ICBM, it looks like them actually realizing this with a weapon able to hit the US mainland is about one year away. Therefore 66 is a success.
  • 69 is only provisionally true and needs to be revised when more GDP data is available.
  • I am apparently rubbish at predicting snap elections, given that I got both 77 and 58 wrong, while being highly confident in my wrongness.
  • Out of all of my failed predictions, the one that surprised me the most was the OPEC deal holding. I really thought that it would fall apart.

A complete list of the sources I used when grading all non-personal predictions is available here.

Calibration

The whole point of having predictions with few allowed probabilities (for me it was 50%, 60%, 70%, 80% and 90%) is that you can then check how accurate these were by pooling your answers. Here’s how I did:

Of my predictions at a 50% confidence level, I got 7 right and 6 wrong (54%).
Of my predictions at a 60% confidence level, I got 9 right and 4 wrong (69%).
Of my predictions at a 70% confidence level, I got 16 right and 4 wrong (80%).
Of my predictions at an 80% confidence level, I got 20 right and 6 wrong (77%).
Of my predictions at a 90% confidence level, I got 17 right and 2 wrong (89%).

If you prefer graphs, here’s the results on a graph. The red line shows what I would get if I was a perfect judge of probability. The blue line is actual me. Whenever the red line is below my results, I was under-confident. Whenever it’s above them, I was overconfident.

I’m pleased that in general (excepting 70% vs. 80%), things I thought were more likely were in fact more likely. I appear to be fairly under-confident at lower probability levels (50% through 70%), and fairly good at higher confidence levels (80% and 90%), although of course this is just one year and some of this could be due to chance and luck.

My meta-calibration was quite poor. I was never more than 10% off from perfect calibration, despite my worries that I would frequently be up to 15% from it.